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EnvironmEntAL CArE EthiCs:  
notEs towArd A nEw  
mAtEriAList CritiquE
AdELinE Johns-PutrA   
Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the pres-
ent without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.
—The World Commission on Environment and Development 
(1987, 43)
To scan the now ubiquitous definition put forward by the Brundtland 
Commission is to realize that our construction of “sustainability” is driven 
by a notion of care—care for the nonhuman environment enfolded with a 
concern for our human descendants.  The rhetoric around our ideal response 
to climate change structures it as an ethical response.  This essay proposes 
that, while so much of the ontology of the global ecological crisis called 
climate change has been closely interrogated, the ethics of care demanded in 
the name of that crisis has not been scrutinized in the same way.  By “care,” 
I mean a feeling of concern for the wellbeing and needs of others; by “care 
ethics,” I mean an ethical position that takes this affective concern as its basis 
for action.1  Given that environmental ethics—the question of human conduct 
and its effect on the human and nonhuman environment—is a profoundly 
ontological project, accounting as it must for the perceived ontological 
difference between the human and nonhuman, this lack of ontological 
scrutiny is conspicuous, to say the least.  
This essay thus offers a theorization of the care ethics of climate change 
and sustainability.  It considers this through the ontological project of new 
materialism, paying attention to the new materialist tendency to discuss 
ontology as agency, and being in terms of becoming.  I propose that care 
1I acknowledge that there are nuanced differences in connotation when it comes to the 
word “care”: it could suggest an attitude of concern (“caring about”), an activity of looking after 
(“caring for”) or a burden and worry (as in the pluralized “cares”).  In dealing with care ethics, 
which derive mainly from affect and attitude, I am interested mostly in “caring about.”  
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too has to be discerned as always becoming, that it is to be considered—to 
invoke Heidegger—not as ontic but as ontological.  And yet, pace Heidegger, 
I suggest that, in an environmental ethics of care, care is more fruitfully 
thought of not as a condition for ontology (as in Heidegger’s Sorge) but as 
itself deserving of ontological query.  Care is not the means by which agency 
occurs; it is itself agential.
New Materialism
The new materialism that has invigorated environmental criticism, and 
that has been particularly important for the project of critical climate change, 
is a reconsideration and re-acknowledgement of the material properties of 
human co-existence with the human and nonhuman.  In other words, new 
materialists accept the fact (or what Heidegger would call the facticity) of 
being in order to interrogate it.2  Formulations such as the “agential realism” 
of Karen Barad and the “speculative materialism” of Quentin Meillassoux, 
both now identifiable with a “new materialism” (Dolphijn and van der Tuin 
2012) or “new ontology” (Hekman 2008, 109), have challenged the linguistic 
or social constructivism that tended to dominate critical theory after post-
structuralism.  New materialists have borrowed much from Bruno Latour’s 
description (1993) of our modern habit of dividing the world into the realms of 
subjects, objects, language and history—when, really, we should be thinking 
of quasi-objects, quasi-subjects, and even discourses—and his identification 
of such units as actants, agents that constantly translate, mediate, and play 
roles.  One should also note that new materialism’s re-considerations of 
human and nonhuman ontology as a question of agency are recognizably 
indebted to the theories of identity performativity of Donna Haraway and 
Judith Butler.  But what has really invigorated new materialism is Latour’s 
famous pronouncement, a kind of volte face, in 2004, that his actor-network 
theory and the Science and Technology Studies (S&TS) inspired in large part 
by it had mistakenly rejected “matters of fact” outright, in its valiant attempt 
at simply redefining them.  Latour called instead for a “second empiricism, 
[a] return to the realist attitude” (2004, 246).  A need for a new empiricism 
is the emerging context for new materialism, a new concern with the fact or 
facticity of materiality and of being.
The key thinker in this regard is Barad, whose interest in ontological 
questions of agency stems from a refusal to accept entities as either static or 
ontic.  She stringently critiques what she calls representationalism, the deeply 
entrenched assumption that there are “two distinct and independent kinds 
of entities—representations, and entities to be represented” (2003, 804).3  For 
2For Heidegger, facticity is the factual nature of the fact of existence: “The factuality of the 
fact Da-sein, as the way in which every Da-sein actually is, we call its facticity” (1996, 56).
3See also Barad (2007), especially Chapters 3, 4 and 7.
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Barad, following physicist Niels Bohr, the “primary epistemological unit” 
is not the object or entity waiting to be represented but “phenomena” (815), 
that is, the constellation of components acting on, in, with or through each 
other.  For Barad, ontology is a question of “the ontological inseparability of 
agentially intra-acting ‘components’” (815).  It is, then, not interaction between 
objects that matters, but “intra-action,” the process by which objects 
become—momentarily and locally—separate and thereby knowable: “It is 
through specific agential intra-actions that the boundaries and properties 
of the ‘components’ of phenomena become determinate and that particular 
embodied concepts become meaningful” (815).  Such “intra-actions enact 
agential separability” (815).  What is especially significant in Barad’s “agential 
realism” for an environmental ethics is the radical, dynamic and local quality 
it imparts to ontology.  It reminds us that apprehension and identification of 
the other occurs not in static opposition but in a dynamic coming together 
and enactment of separability, the so-called “agential cut” (815).  Importantly, 
as we shall see later, for Barad, the phenomena that intra-act in this way are 
not simply human and nonhuman others, but material-discursive practices 
(818).  They should be thought of not as things ontically given, but as things 
materially and discursively fabricated.  Indeed, objects only ever come to be 
in a relational, intra-active process.  
Thus, it is not just that human and nonhuman objects become meaningful 
to me because I recognize them.  (Such, for Meillassoux, is the mistake of 
“correlationism” [2008, 5-9]).4  It is also that I too enter into ontological 
significance in acts of encounter with and recognition of others.  New 
materialism insists, then, on the equal claims of human subjects and human 
or nonhuman objects to ontological significance, and it is here that we have 
to consider the sister project of “object-oriented ontology.”  The term was first 
posited by Graham Harman and then taken up in an environmental context 
by Timothy Morton to develop his notion of hyperobjects, that is, objects that 
exist on such unthinkable temporal and spatial scales that they challenge the 
idea of a subjectivity capable of comprehending them (2011).  Object-oriented 
ontology, like Meillassoux’s speculative materialism and Barad’s agential 
realism, decenters (human) subjectivity.  However, where Morton’s theories 
differ crucially from Barad’s is in Morton’s implicit querying of the immediacy 
and locality of encounter that, for Barad, defines her conceptualization of 
ontology as agency.  Morton, often concerned with the limit-case phenomena 
of hyperobjects, asserts that interobjectivity (more or less congruent with 
“intra-action”) can occur across unthinkably large scales of time and space 
(2010, 130-31).5  Hence, objects are always partially withdrawn even as they 
4Thus, Meillassoux, read alongside Barad, offers an important reminder that the dynamic of 
intra-action, with its paradigm of objects and others in becoming, is more than a simple embrace 
of contingency.  It is an acknowledgement of the necessity of contingency as the ground by which 
all is rendered meaningful.  
5See also Morton’s essay, “Poisoned Ground: Art and Philosophy in the Time of 
Hyperobjects” in this issue, in which he states, for example, “Every event is a kind of inscription 
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are apprehended.  There is something to these objects that can never be 
known.  Further, although Morton takes for granted that such objects are, 
as it were, intra-actively constituted, he warns against “relationism,” the 
assumption that “objects are nothing more than the sum of their relations 
with other objects” (2011, 184).  In my reading, then, the difference between 
Barad’s and Morton’s formulations of agency and ontology is a matter of 
emphasis: Morton is interested in objects in motion; Barad is concerned with 
objects in motion.  Despite this difference, however, Barad and Morton, when 
considered alongside each other, offer a crucial insight to anyone concerned 
with human and nonhuman relations in a time of climate change.  New 
materialism and object-oriented ontology together foreground the way in 
which ontology is about becoming as much as it is about being.  
Such a reformulation of human ontology and agency is of particular 
interest to an investigation of care and its implications for an ethical positioning 
of the human.  Yet, while I acknowledge the significance of an object-oriented 
ontology for rethinking the one-sided anthropocentricism that characterizes 
correlationism, I wonder too if object-oriented ontology has distracted us 
from considerations of environmental care ethics.  The decentering impulse 
of object-oriented ontology shies away from any interrogation of the effect 
of the human object (let’s not even say “subject”) on other objects.  New 
materialism and object-oriented ontology easily mistake a consideration 
of human agency and ontology for the old-fashioned, outdated investment 
in subjectivity that is correlationism.  Hence a new materialist critique of 
environmental care ethics—of the affective considerations that shape human 
conduct and its impact on humans and nonhumans now and in the future—
has not yet been undertaken.6 
Environmental Care Ethics
In approaching care ethics, one must briefly take account of the late 
twentieth-century cultural-feminist notion of the “ethic of care” and its impact 
on ecofeminist thought and practice.  An alternative female ethic was first 
proposed by Carol Gilligan (1982): her wide-ranging study of the bases for 
women’s moral responses built on psychoanalytical object-relations theory, 
and showed how women are continually psychologically conditioned to care, 
as girls, as wives and, most of all, as mothers.  Gilligan’s work, in conjunction 
with that of Nel Noddings (1984), came to be widely acknowledged as an 
alternative, female-derived set of normative ethics, and is one of the most 
enduring legacies of second-wave feminism.  It was taken up by ecofeminist 
in which one object leaves its footprint in another one.  Interobjective reality is just the sum total 
of all these footprints, crisscrossing everywhere.  This sum total is nonlocal by definition.”
6Barad (2007, 391-96) discusses the “ethics of mattering,” not in relation to care but in 
relation to a Levinasian mode of “responsibility.”
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thinkers as the basis for an environmental and explicitly feminist ethics.  The 
most sustained versions of ecofeminist care ethics are Carolyn Merchant’s 
“earthcare” (1996) and Merchant’s (1980) and Val Plumwood’s critiques of 
reason/nature dualism; nonetheless, the identification and promotion of a 
gendered care ethics is widespread and may be found at both ends of the 
spectrum of ecofeminist thought, from the spiritual (for example, Charlene 
Spretnak) to the standpoint or political (for example, Ariel Salleh and Mary 
Mellor).
The viability of care as an ethical model has come under intense 
interrogation in the past decade.  One of the first extensive critiques, made by 
Joan C. Tronto, queried the assumption that private human relations could 
so easily translate into a political model of action.  Tronto points out, among 
other things, that parochialism and paternalism rank as the “two primary 
dangers of care as a political ideal” (1993, 170).  Put another way, what is 
often overlooked is the way in which caring-about something or someone (a) 
implies not-caring-about others and (b) risks caring-too-much.  The problems 
with a specifically ecofeminist ethics of care have subsequently been dealt 
with by Chris J. Cuomo, Catriona Sandilands, and Sherilyn MacGregor. 
All three echo Tronto when they identify the emotional power-plays that 
can characterize care in intimate or familial relationships—self-sacrifice, 
self-victimization, guilt, resentment, powerlessness; they further warn of 
the consequences of amplifying these in a political mode.  In other words, 
if we fail to take stock of their emotional baggage, then the highly personal 
and affective dynamics at the heart of such ecofeminist care ethic systems as 
“motherhood environmentalism” (Sandilands 1999, 4) and “ecomaternalism” 
(MacGregor 2006, 20) offer a far from ideal model for citizenship.  Cuomo, 
Sandilands and MacGregor insist care ethics must relentlessly contextualize. 
It must always ask: who does the caring and who or what is cared for; who 
gets to make these decisions; what models of human-to-human care are we 
invoking in the process (friendship, kinship, marriage, parenthood, and so 
on); and what are the gender dynamics of our models of care?
A new materialist approach enhances these earlier critiques; that is to 
say, it reveals that the reasons for a vigilant contextualization of care are 
profoundly ontological.  In short, care has to be recognized as intra-active: 
carer and cared-about are identities formed in a dynamic of agential 
separability.  These entities come to be, that is, they come to matter, in the 
very terms of the encounter.  They are not, therefore, ontic, stable subjects or 
objects.  
There are several corollaries of understanding care as intra-active that I 
can think of for environmental care ethics.  First, different objects of care demand 
different kinds of care: put another way, there are different attitudes of care to be 
adopted depending on what or who is cared about.  To borrow Morton’s terms, 
objects of care are profoundly withdrawn, i.e., not wholly knowable, and so 
we must consider that some are more withdrawn than others.  I think I know 
and care about my stepchildren or about the grass in the back garden in a 
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way that is very different from how I understand and care about a climate-
changed planet.  All are strange strangers in their way but such differing 
levels of strangeness invite very different care responses from me.  This may 
all seem blindingly obvious but has been surprisingly little recognized in 
environmental care ethics, which tends to efface with astonishing ease the 
distinction between what it means to care about humans and what it means 
to care about the nonhuman environment.  Take, for example, Merchant’s 
earthcare, which she defines as a “partnership ethic” that “means that both 
women and men can enter into mutual relationships with each other and the 
planet independently of gender” (1996, 216).  The implication here that a human 
other and the (nonhuman?) planet present themselves as potential partners 
on the same terms must be scanned.  To what extent can one’s relationship 
with another human be compared to one’s relationship with the planet, 
invoked monolithically?  The relative incomprehensibility of the nonhuman 
apropos the human must be acknowledged; it cannot be waved away as some 
fault of the human for not being perceptive enough to “hear” the “voice” of 
“nature.”  This is not to say that human-to-human communications are ever 
unmediated.  But it is to say that human-to-nonhuman communication is 
necessarily mediated by the human.  As soon as we enter into environmentalist 
discourse, we make the nonhuman speak for us, in our willing it to speak 
to us.  As Sandilands reminds us, environmentalism is impossible without 
the “subjectivation” (1999, 80) of the environment, without rendering nature 
the subject of our making.7  Inevitably, our care response to any nonhuman 
phenomena runs in tandem with this subjectivating impulse.  
It is not just that we must consider cautiously the difference between 
humans and non-humans as recipients of care.  To return to the Brundtland 
definition, we can see that notions of sustainable care elide what it means to 
care about humans and nonhumans today with what it means to care about 
humans tomorrow.  Here, it is worth taking a leaf out of the book of green 
political theory, even though it tends to eschew affective ethics in favor of 
non-affective notions of justice.  Writing in the 1990s, John Barry and Avner 
de-Shalit recognize that the moral obligations that citizens of the present 
grant to citizens of the future cannot be reciprocated.  Barry imagines a 
constitutionally-enshrined “ecological contract” that would “consider both 
non-humans and future human descendants ‘moral subjects’ (worthy of moral 
consideration but not morally responsible agents)” (1996, 122).  De-Shalit 
proposes a “‘communitarian’ theory of intergenerational justice” (1995, 
12), discussing the obligations that link what he calls a “transgenerational 
community” (13-50), but stipulating that these obligations fade for future 
generations remote in time because of a diminishing “moral similarity” (58, 
62-65).  In other words, my step-children’s children’s children (or rather the 
7See Sandilands (1999, 88): “The nature that we may find in ecological searches for a subject 
is always a construction of that Other from the point at which we appear to ourselves as natural 
or natured, not nature itself.”
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thought of my step-children’s children’s children) may evoke a care response 
from me, but they are strange strangers indeed.
A second corollary of understanding care as intra-active: it is not just 
that different objects of care demand different kinds of care responses, but 
any given object of care will not demand, invite or request a single uniform or 
absolute or continuous kind of care response.  As Morton would have it, objects 
withdraw at different speeds.  Thus, differing levels of strangeness from the 
same apparent object invite different care responses at different times.  In this 
regard, I confess that my teenaged step-children are a very apt example, but 
the shifting parameters of our knowledge about the Higgs boson or Hurricane 
Sandy make these just as appropriate.  As Barad puts it, referring here not to 
caring but to responding, “Different material intra-actions produce different 
materializations of the world, and hence there are specific stakes in how 
responsiveness is enacted” (2007, 380).  
Now, a third correlative: if care can no longer be thought of as constant 
and predictable in quality and quantity even with regard to the same object 
or phenomenon, given the momentary nature of agential matter, then the iden-
tity of carer can no longer be assumed to be premised on a stable or specific amount 
of care.  It is no good saying “I care about the planet” or “I care about you” 
or, worse still, “I care” or, even worse still, “women care,” without thinking 
about how that agency is contingent on the care response, and how, further, 
that care response is also contingent.  This kind of recourse to care as confer-
ring some kind of grand subjecthood or, indeed, as granting some but not 
others a privileged relationship to nonhuman phenomena and objects lies at 
the heart of the identity politics of ecofeminism.  It bespeaks, at the very least, 
an epistemological laziness.
A New Materialist Care Ethics
However, there is more to a new materialist care ethics, an intra-active 
dynamic of care, than this.  We have to consider now the possibility—a 
seemingly logical conclusion, given what I have been arguing—that care is 
the mode by which objects are known.  After all, our apprehension of those 
objects is inevitably shaped by caring.  When, say, we purport to care about 
the environment, from that point on we know it as this thing that we care 
about and it is defined in relation to us.  More significantly, it may even 
be impossible to tell at what point knowing becomes caring, or indeed if 
there is such a point at all.  As soon as something is apprehended it is cared 
about in some way, inasmuch as it evokes a response that is unavoidably 
affective, even if this amounts to feeling that one doesn’t feel very much at 
all.  This conceptualization of caring as knowing comes close to Heidegger’s 
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theorization of “care” as Sorge (literally, “worry” or “care”) (1996, 180-230).8 
Sorge is the very ground of our becoming, the structure by which humans 
comprehend their unique ontological state, comprised of existence, thrown-
ness, and fallen-ness.  These three terms refer (more or less respectively) to: 
humans’ understanding of our existence and the possibilities this opens up; 
the fact (or, more accurately, facticity) of our existence; and our giving away 
of self as we engage with others.  Care as Sorge refers to the pre-ontological 
totality of these complex negotiations of being, being-in-the-world and being 
with others—it is “ontologically prior to the phenomena” of “willing and 
wishing or urge and predilection” (Heidegger 1996, 194)—and it is therefore 
akin to a theorization of care as a condition for intra-action.  However, 
Heidegger’s notion of care could do with a further new materialist reworking 
(and not just because of its anthropocentric focus), as, indeed, could any 
argument that care is the ground on which the phenomenal enactments of 
agential separability occur.
A truly workable new materialist vision of care would recognize that 
what we think of as the world about which we care is a collection of intra-
active units—or what Latour (1987, 2005) would call actants.  The dynamic of 
carer and cared-about that I have described thus far is more fruitfully thought 
of in terms of constellations of intra-actions (Barad), or a network (Latour), or 
a mesh (Morton) of objects.  These all have agency and identity as they come 
together or, more accurately, they have agency and identity in their coming 
together.  However, as Barad reminds us, those units are not just the familiar 
human or nonhuman actors but the discursive units and material units that 
make up our understanding of the world—her phenomena are made up of 
“material-discursive practices through which boundaries are constituted” 
(2003, 818).  To illustrate how Barad’s anti-representationalism works in the 
context of care, I offer a somewhat childish—and therefore, I hope, useful—
example: think about your knowledge or apprehension of the thing called 
the Tyrannosaurus Rex.  Your Tyrannosaurus Rex is necessarily the product 
of a text, probably a popular cultural one (Jurassic Park or Calvin and Hobbes 
or perhaps Willis O’Brien’s awesome early stop motion films).  No doubt it 
also emerges from various bits of trivia, the extent of which depends on how 
much you were interested in (or cared about) dinosaurs as a child or, indeed, 
whether you have any professional paleontological knowledge as an adult. 
It isn’t just the case that the Tyrannosaurus Rex pre-exists the text through 
which you know it and has been merely represented in it.  The Tyrannosaurus 
Rex as you know it is the product of the intra-action of different but no less 
real discursive and material units, that is, the mediatory and translatory effect 
of these actants on and through one other.  Those units include not merely 
those discursive phenomena that you encountered and continue to encounter 
(the novels, the films, the textbooks, Wikipedia entries) and not merely the 
material concerns that surround your encounters, from the DVDs and/or 
8For a useful elucidation, see King (2001, 35-40).
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television you watch to the computer you use to the books you read.  They 
include too the discursive-material hybridity that is the shared understanding 
of cultural connotations enabling your reading or viewing.  This consists of, 
among other things, the prior expectations that allow you to make sense of 
the very act of reading, what the book or DVD looked like as you picked 
it up, even the assumption—made by you, the director, the studio, and the 
entire film distribution network—that a “film” is worth spending any time 
or money on at all.  Finally, the care, in all its complexity, that you exerted 
on finding out about the Tyrannosaurus Rex is as important a component 
of this understanding as any aspect of genre, form or material context. 
Importantly, then, it is not just the naïve representationalist relationship of 
you and the Tyrannosaurus Rex that should come under scrutiny here, but 
the galaxy of intra-active units that contributes to what we think of as its 
representation.  Among these units is care (as well as the intra-active units 
that comprise care).  If we replace the example of the Tyrannosaurus Rex with 
“the planet” or “nature” or “climate change,” we see the representationalist 
fallacy committed in the name of environmental care ethics and discern the 
need to rethink care into an intricate web.  
Care, then, is best construed not as the ground or even the vector for intra-
action, but as itself a unit involved in intra-action.  As I suggested earlier, to 
assert, “I care,” as a claim to identity is to disregard how the agency of caring 
is contingent on the level and quality of caring, and how that caring is always 
contextualized.  As units involved in a network of shifting identities, the 
“carer,” the “caring” and the “cared-about” as well as “care” itself all exhibit 
similar ontological qualities.  Care—the emotional affective phenomenon or 
the apparently rational ethical response—is in no way deserving of special 
integrity or immanence as a pre-ontological condition.  When Morton, 
following Harman, proposes “sincerity” as a kind of meta-awareness with 
which to greet hyperobjects, this seems to allocate to affective and ethical 
response an ontic property.9  But where would the ground for such sincerity 
come from?  How is it given?  If we as new materialists are to grasp the nature 
of being, we have to think about how any one “position” of sincerity, like one 
of care, is inhabited as a momentary stance.  
This is not simply a reconsideration of care; it entails no less than a 
rethinking of what we mean by ethics and by ethical systems.  But neither 
is this an apologia for unethical behavior, where such connotes an outright 
rejection of conscience.  This fear of the fall from conscience is what motivates 
Latour’s restatement of empiricism in 2004.  Yet, the constant weighing up 
of agency and ontology required in an effort to do right by all the others in 
the mesh—akin to Ray Brassier’s regarding of nihilism as “not an existential 
quandary but a speculative opportunity” (2007, xi)—actually takes a 
tremendous amount of conscientious behavior.  As I have said elsewhere, 
9See Morton’s “Poisoned Ground: Art and Philosophy in the Time of Hyperobjects,” in this 
issue.
134
perhaps the word “thoughtful,” in both senses of the word, is a handy 
modifier for “care,” as it nicely gestures toward the kind of considerate and 
considered set of responses being proposed here, and the attention that needs 
to be paid to the inevitable ebbs and flows of care.10
Such attention to the agential fluidity of care brings into plain sight the 
traps of guilt and resentment into which advocates of environmental care 
ethics often fall.  Claims tend to get made for some being able to care about 
the environment more than others (think not just of ecofeminism but of the 
fetishizing of indigenous belief and ritual in certain ecocritical quarters, 
which disturbingly evokes the naïveté of eighteenth-century “noble savage” 
rhetoric).  Or anxieties circulate about how equitable we are in doling out 
care, whether some are indeed more deserving of care than others (in debates 
over the advantages and disadvantages of our affective relationships with 
charismatic mega-fauna, for example).  Better to imagine, surely, that the 
diverse elements of our (human and nonhuman) environments include all 
the ratiocinative or affective responses that we label as thoughts and feelings, 
rather than emanating from or existing somehow subject to them.  Care is 
part of the discursive and material mesh from which objects emerge.  Care—
in the act of being named and purportedly exercised—emerges from and 
re-submerges into that mesh.
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